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This study examines how bank ownership influenced the credit supply during the recent 
financial crisis in Russia, where the banking sector consists of a mix of state-controlled 
banks,  foreign-owned  banks,  and  domestic  private  banks.  To  estimate  credit  supply 
changes, we employ an exhaustive dataset for Russian banks that covers the crisis period 
and apply an original approach based on stochastic frontier analysis. Our findings suggest 
bank ownership affected credit supply during the financial crisis and that the crisis led to 
an overall decrease in the credit supply. Relative to domestic private banks foreign-owned 
banks reduced their credit supply more and state-controlled banks less. This supports the 
hypothesis that foreign banks have a “lack of loyalty” to domestic actors during a crisis, as 
well as the view that an objective function of state-controlled banks leads them to support 
the economy during economic downturns. 
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Tutkimuksessa  tarkastellaan,  miten  pankin  omistuspohja  vaikutti  luoton  tarjontaan 
viimeisimmän finanssikriisin aikana Venäjällä, jossa pankkijärjestelmä jakautuu lukuisiin 
valtion hallitsemiin, ulkomaisessa omistuksessa oleviin ja yksityisiin pankkeihin. Luoton 
tarjonnan estimoinnissa käytetään laajaa, kriisiajan kattavaa aineistoa Venäjän pankeista, 
sekä uutta stokastiseen rintama-analyysiin perustuvaa menetelmää. Tutkimustulosten mu-
kaan pankin omistussuhteella oli vaikutusta luoton tarjontaan, joka supistui yleisesti kriisin 
aikana. Verrattuna yksityisiin pankkeihin, ulkomaiset pankit tiukensivat luoton tarjontaa 
enemmän ja valtion hallitsemat pankit vähemmän. Tutkimustulos tukee hypoteesia ulko-
maisten pankkien ‟sitoutumisen puutteesta‟ (lack of loyalty) kotimaisia toimijoita kohtaan, 
sekä näkemystä jonka mukaan valtion hallitsemat pankit tukevat tavoitteidensa mukaisesti 
talouden kasvua kriisin aikana. 
 
JEL: D14, G21 
Asiasanat: pankki, luottopolitiikka, ulkomainen omistus, valtion omistus, stokastinen  
rintama-analyysi 
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1  Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis has provoked major economic troubles. A key channel of trans-
mission has been the contraction of credit supply by banks. This contraction was primarily 
caused by a reduction of transactions in the interbank markets and a clear reluctance on the 
part of banks to lend. The message to the broader global economy was unequivocal: banks 
were not just having a harder time lending, they were less willing to lend. 
Credit supply by banks is of particular importance in emerging countries, where 
rudimentary financial markets place banks in a fundamental financing role. Foreign-owned 
banks and state-controlled banks typically hold significant market shares in these countries, 
so both groups are well poised to influence credit supply in times of crisis.  
Our aim in this paper is to examine how bank ownership influences credit supply 
in troubled times. Our research is motivated by the fact that bank ownership can exert an 
impact on lending behavior in two ways. 
Economic difficulties of the host country may cause foreign-owned banks to pull 
back on lending more than domestic banks. This is referred to in the literature as a “lack of 
loyalty” on the part of foreign banks (Weill, 2003). Notably, the empirical literature com-
paring lending behavior of domestic and foreign banks in emerging markets in the 1990s 
does not support this hypothesis. In Latin America during the 1990s, for example, Peek 
and Rosengren (2000) and Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) find that domestic and for-
eign banks exhibited the same lending behavior during periods of crisis. Arena, Reinhart 
and Vazquez (2007) also study the impact of lending of foreign banks on the lending chan-
nel in emerging countries and find no significant differences in the impacts of foreign and 
domestic banks. 
State-controlled banks, in contrast, may bolster their lending during a crisis to 
support  the  economy.  Two  arguments  can  explain  this  behavior  following  Sapienza 
(2004)‟s terminology; the political view, and the social view. According to the political 
view, the principal of state-controlled banks – the government – uses these institutions to 
pursue its interests, such as enhancing its chances of reelection or avoiding political unrest. 
According to the social view, the government asks state-controlled banks to compensate 
for market failures such as externalities that can lead to the lack of financing for socially 
profitable  projects.  Both  views  lead  to  the  fact  that  the  objective  function  of  state-Zuzana Fungáčová, Risto Herrala and Laurent Weill  The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: 
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controlled banks is likely to include stabilization of the economy. As a consequence, the 
government may be willing to limit a credit contraction in troubled times.  
The literature finds numerous instances in which state-owned banks display lend-
ing behavior different from private banks. For example, Dinc (2005) shows how lending of 
state-owned banks correlates with the electoral cycle in a cross-country study. State-owned 
banks boost lending in election years relative to private banks, suggesting a different objec-
tive function for both types of banks. Micco and Panizza (2006) perform a cross-country 
analysis to investigate the role of the business cycle in the comparative lending behavior of 
state-owned and private banks. They find that the lending of state-owned banks is less sen-
sitive to macroeconomic shocks than that of private banks. This finding reinforces the view 
that state-owned banks consider macroeconomic stabilization in their objective function. In 
a related vein, Jia (2009) analyzes the relationship between ownership and the prudential 
behavior of banks in China by comparing state-owned and joint-equity banks. He observes 
that state-owned banks are less prudent in lending. This finding suggests that in times of 
crisis state-owned banks are more reluctant to pare back lending than other banks. 
This investigation into the role of bank ownership on credit supply in troubled 
times contributes to the literature on two fronts. 
First,  Russia‟s  banking  industry  consists  of  a  mix  of  state-controlled,  foreign-
owned and domestic private banks, making it fairly straightforward to compare the lending 
behavior  of  foreign  banks  and  state-owned  banks  against  private  domestic  banks.  The 
magnitude of recent financial crisis further provides an opportunity to analyze shifts in pat-
terns of credit supply according to bank ownership. We employ a rich dataset that includes 
quarterly data on all Russian banks that allows us to analyze thoroughly the evolution of 
credit supply over the period from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2009. 
Second, we employ an original approach to estimating credit supply from bank-
level data that allows us to separate credit supply from credit demand without resorting to 
detailed data on borrowers and lenders. Unlike Khwaja and Mian (2008), we do not need 
detailed data on all credit market participants to disentangle both sides of the credit market. 
Our approach derives from the hypothesis formalized by Holmström and Tirole (1997) that 
credit supply is constrained by bank capital. If at least some banks are capital constrained, 
then credit supply can be estimated from the observed distribution of bank lending under 
relatively mild conditions. It is identified as the maximum of the bank lending distribution, 
and can be estimated in a parametric form using stochastic frontier analysis. To allow in-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 34/ 2011 
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ference concerning the impact of bank type on credit supply, we allow credit supply to de-
pend on bank type, bank capital, and idiosyncratic factors.
1 This method has been applied 
by Chen and Wang (2008) for Taiwan and Herrala (2009) for Finland to esti mate credit 
supply from borrower data. Stochastic frontier analysis has also been widely applied in the 
banking literature to estimate bank efficiency (most notably, the 2010 study of Karas, 
Schoors and Weill on Russian banks). 
Our results on the link between bank ownership and lending during recession have 
normative implications for banking policy in emerging markets. A finding in favor of a 
stronger reduction in lending for foreign banks in comparison to domestic banks supports 
restricting foreign bank entry. Conversely, an observation of a small reduction in lending 
for state-owned banks relative to privately owned banks supports the continued existence 
of state-owned banks. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of 
the Russian banking industry during the recent financial crisis. Section 3 explicates our 
methodology and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our results, and section 6 
summarizes with a couple of policy observations. 
 
 
2  The Russian banking industry and the crisis 
 
The development of Russia‟s banking sector in the 2000s mirrored much of what tran-
spired elsewhere in emerging markets. In addition to a rapid expansion of the banking sec-
tor (total assets grew on average a more than 35% a year), Russian banks began to provide 
a wide variety of services to corporate and household clients. The ratios of banking sector 
assets to GDP and credit to GDP more than doubled during the decade, with these ratios 
reaching 75% and 40%, respectively, by end-2010 (Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion, 2011). Despite this significant increase in financial intermediation, however, both ra-
tios were still lower than in most emerging markets. 
Russian banks can be divided into three main groups in terms of ownership. The 
first  group  consists  of  the  state-controlled  banks  that  dominate  the  sector.  Unlike  the 
emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe, which used privatization to create 
banking  sectors  today  dominated  by  large  international  players,  Russia  preserved  the 
                                                 
1 See Berrospide and Edge (2010) for a recent survey on the effects of bank capital on lending. Zuzana Fungáčová, Risto Herrala and Laurent Weill  The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: 
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dominance of its state banks (resembling in some respects the current arrangement in 
China). Depending on the definition used, Russia has about 40 state-controlled banks that 
control slightly more than half of total banking sector assets.
2 Russia‟s five largest banks 
are all state-controlled. As state banks, they face lower constraints in financing, hold an 
abundance of cheap household deposits, and enjoy ready access to refinancing from the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR). 
The next group is made up of foreign-owned banks. Their share of the banking 
sector, while still below 20% of total assets, increased steadily over the past decade (up 
from 174 foreign-owned banks in 2000 to 220 at the end of 2010). Foreigners hold the ma-
jority in about half of banks with foreign participation. Three of Russia‟s top 10 banks 
were foreign-owned as of end-June 2011. Foreign-owned banks in Russia tend to rely on 
external funding from their parent companies. 
All the other banks operating in Russia are domestic private banks. There are a lot 
of such banks, about 700 in total. Most are small, but they are in some cases important re-
gional players. They account collectively for about 5% of total banking system assets.  
Following a stretch of growth that included implementation of reforms and im-
provement in the legal environment, the Russian banking sector appeared in early 2008 to 
be in relatively good shape to withstand a crisis. Further, Russian banks were not directly 
exposed to the financial instruments that triggered the global turmoil. Yet the Russian 
banking sector, along with the rest of the economy, succumbed to the global financial crisis 
in mid-2008 with the dual shocks of a sudden lack of access to foreign financing and a sig-
nificant drop in the price of oil.  
As loan growth before the crisis exceeded growth of deposits, banks turned to ex-
ternal sources to finance the resulting gap. Russia has traditionally lacked long-term fund-
ing resources, so most funding came from abroad predominantly in the form of short-term 
borrowing. Banks were joined by Russian non-financial companies in turning to interna-
tional markets to obtain financing. Thus, when the supply of foreign credit was cut, nu-
merous banks and other companies found themselves in immediate difficulties. This situa-
tion was exacerbated by falling oil prices that led to a collapse in Russian share prices. 
Margin calls were especially hard for those who had used shares as collateral in lending. 
Capital flows reversed and Russia‟s trade balance suffered as oil prices slid and the country 
                                                 
2 See Vernikov (2009) for detailed information on state ownership of banks in Russia. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 34/ 2011 
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fell into recession. With intense depreciation pressure on ruble, the CBR implemented an 
incremental 30% devaluation of the ruble between November 2008 and February 2009. 
The official response to the crisis was to move swiftly and go big. Starting in au-
tumn 2008, the Russian government and CBR introduced a variety of measures to support 
stability of the financial system and prevent systemic collapse. These measures included a 
temporary decrease in bank reserve requirements, CBR guarantees of interbank lending to 
qualified banks, non-collateralized central bank loans, loosening of definition of acceptable 
collateral at the lombard window and in repo operations, as well as auctions allocating free 
budgetary funds to banks. The deposit insurance framework was enhanced by increasing 
the amounts covered by deposit insurance and Russia‟s deposit insurance agency assumed 
the task of restructuring individual troubled banks. Large and systemically important banks 
were targeted for capital injections. The funds were provided directly by the government or 
through unsecured subordinated loans from the CBR or the state development bank Vne-
shekonombank (VEB).The government also made resources available to VEB to help refi-
nance and service foreign debt of Russian firms. 
All these actions helped stabilize not just the banking system but the economy as a 
whole. Measures to support liquidity in the banking system were gradually withdrawn in 
2010, by which time most banks no longer suffered from liquidity shortfalls. Instead, banks 
were struggling with rising stocks of nonperforming loans on their balance sheets, a situa-
tion that made them reluctant to lend. Most chose to pull back on lending and pursue a less 
risky course of acquiring government bonds and sitting on them. Bank lending, which had 
seen growth averaging 45% a year between 2002 and 2007 dropped to -2.5% in 2009. It 
was not until the second quarter of 2010 that very modest growth returned.  
 
 
3  Methodology 
 
Our method of estimating credit supply is based on the model of Holmström and Tirole 
(1997) for capital-constrained lending. They argue that the loan supply of banks is con-
strained by bank capital. Accordingly, we assume a stochastic, log-linear loan supply con-
straint: 
 
  (1) Zuzana Fungáčová, Risto Herrala and Laurent Weill  The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: 
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In equation (1), i denotes bank, t time, L risk weighted assets, C capital, and v a stochastic 
disturbance. The parameter α is a „proportionality factor‟ of the loan supply constraint on 
capital, and β is the „scale effect‟ of bank size. If β=1, no scale economies are present in 
the loan supply constraint. If β>1, then larger banks can supply more loans than smaller 
banks relative to their capital. The credit supply constraint (1) can also be rationalized from 
the point of view of supervision that imposes capital requirements on bank lending. The 
Basel II capital requirement is characterized as α=12.5; β=1; and v=0. 
Our aim is  to  estimate the parameters of the credit supply  constraint (1), and 
thereby gain insight about credit supply. To accomplish this, we consider two types of 
banks. The first is the case studied by Holmström and Tirole (1997) − a constrained bank 
for which credit demand exceeds the bank‟s credit supply constraint. Here, the supply con-
straint (1) holds with equality and observed aggregate lending of the bank is accordingly 
supply-determined. The second is an unconstrained bank for which credit demand falls 
short  of  the  credit  supply  constraint.  In  this  case,  observed  bank  lending  is  demand-
determined.  
To account for both types of banks in the analysis, we denote by exp[-uit], the (in-
verse) distance of a bank from its loan supply constraint:  
 
  (2) 
 
Since the loan supply constraint (the denominator) is an upper bound of L by (1), the do-
main of exp[-uit] is the unit line. Constrained banks are characterized by exp[-uit]=1. For 
unconstrained banks, u falls below unity. We can interpret exp[-uit] as an indicator of credit 
demand relative to supply.  
Equations (1) and (2) yield the equation: 
 
  (3) 
 
where l and c are respectively the logged values of risk-weighted assets and capital. Equa-
tion (3) is a stochastic frontier model. Standard estimation methods apply when v and u are 
independent  random  variables  from  specific  distributions.  We  employ  the  standard  as-
sumptions in our estimations that v is normal and that u is either exponential or half-
normal. Our main estimation assumes an exponential distribution, as it provides a greater 
log-likelihood for the model. In estimations, we allow and confirm heteroscedasticity in BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 34/ 2011 
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both u and v. We estimate a pooled cross-section, rather than a panel, because it is impor-
tant that all model parameters, including residual distributions, can change over time. 
To investigate how the recent global financial crisis affected the loan supply of 
banks in Russia, equation (3) is estimated with Russian bank data that covers both the pre-
crisis and the crisis period. The main interest is in changes in parameters α and β, which 
reveal changes in loan supply of banks relative to bank capital as the crisis progresses. It is 
important to note that these parameters capture all supply shocks that affect banks‟ loan 
supply relative to their capital. Such shocks include disturbances in the operation of the 
interbank market, systemic deposit runs, monetary policy, and regulation. The idiosyn-
cratic residual v captures bank specific supply shocks, such as runs on individual banks.  
We first look to see if bank ownership exerts an impact on credit supply during 
the financial crisis. To do so, we add dummy variables for government ownership and for-
eign ownership in the frontier model, i.e. these variables are always viewed relative to do-
mestic private ownership. Further, we include interaction between ownership and time 
dummy variables for each quarter of the sample period. We add time dummies for all peri-
ods except the first one, so all other dummy variables must be interpreted as a comparison 
with the first quarter of 2007. This setup enables us to analyze the evolution of credit sup-
ply behavior for each category of banks by considering the evolution of the interaction 
variables between ownership and time dummy variables over the period. 
The estimated equation takes the following form: 
 
  (4) 
 
where s stands for state ownership dummy variable, f is a foreign ownership dummy vari-
able, i is the index for banks, and t indicates the quarters 0 to 11 corresponding with the 
period 2007Q1-2009Q4. 
To interpret, the α -parameter is the proportionality factor in 2007Q1 in private 
banks. Parameters s and f indicate the difference in the proportionality factor of state-
controlled and foreign banks relative to private banks in 2007Q1. Parameters t indicate 
changes in the proportionality factor in private banks relative to 2007Q1. Parameters st 
and ft indicate the difference in the change of the proportionality factor of state-controlled 
and foreign banks relative to private banks. The β parameter is the scale effect in 2007Q1, 
and t the change in the scale effect relative to that period. Our interest focuses on parame-Zuzana Fungáčová, Risto Herrala and Laurent Weill  The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: 
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ters st and ft, which reveal, whether credit supply constraints developed differently in 
state-controlled banks and foreign banks relative to domestic private banks.  
 
 
4  Data 
 
Our analysis is based on the detailed bank level dataset of all Russian banks covering the 
period from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009. It contains quarterly balance sheet 
and income statement information provided by the financial information agency Interfax, 
which collects and organizes this data from the CBR.
3 The data are further cleaned by 
dropping observations that fulfill at least one of the following conditions: the ratio of aver-
age total loans to total assets is less than or equal to 5%, the sum of deposits is zero, or the 
capital-to-assets ratio is larger than 100% or less than 2%.
4 We only consider banks that 
participate in deposit insurance scheme (those outside the scheme are not allowed to  col-
lect household deposits). Our final sample consists of over 10,000 bank -quarter observa-
tions. For the all-important risk-weighted assets variable, we have available some 6,000 
observations. Fortunately, this does not constitute a problem since the data   on risk-
weighted assets are mostly missing for small banks that are not crucial to systemic stability 
of the banking sector. The descriptive statistics of capital adequacy ratio for all ownership 
subgroups are provided in Table 1. 
We distinguish between foreign-owned and domestic banks (which can be either 
state-controlled or privately held). State-controlled banks are defined as banks that are ma-
jority-owned by the government, the central bank, state -controlled companies or munici-
palities. To identify them, we use the classification of Vernikov (2009). Foreign -owned 
banks are those that have foreign ownership in excess of 50%, which is in line with how 





                                                 
3 For a more detailed description of the dataset, see Karas and Schoors (2005). 
4 Russian regulations call for withdrawal of a bank‟s license if its capital ratio falls below 2%. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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5  Results 
 
In this section, we first present results from our main model and then results using alterna-
tive specifications. 
 
5.1  Main estimations 
 
Our main model assumes an exponential distribution for the inefficiency term. The results 
are presented in Table 2. Several striking results are immediately apparent.  
First, given the level of capital credit supply falls with the arrival of the crisis. 
Time dummy variables are all significant and negative from the fourth quarter of 2008, 
when the world crisis hit Russia, until the end of the sample period. Before that time, most 
are not significant, even if the ones for 07Q4 and 08Q2 were also significantly negative. 
These results confirm the impact of the financial crisis with a significantly stronger influ-
ence starting in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
Second, foreign banks overall reduce their credit supply more than domestic pri-
vate banks. The interaction variables between foreign ownership and time dummy vari-
ables are not significant for 2007, i.e. there is no significant difference in the behaviors of 
foreign banks and domestic private banks. The estimated coefficients become significantly 
negative for the first two quarters of 2008 before the crisis reaches Russia. This time period 
corresponds to turmoil elsewhere in the global markets. It appears the watershed moment 
for parent companies of foreign banks operating in Russia took place in late March 2008 
after the collapse of Bear Stearns. We further find significant estimated coefficients of in-
teraction variables for the last two quarters of 2009. Thus, even if the difference in behav-
ior does not persist for all periods, these results support the view of a “lack of loyalty” on 
the part of foreign banks, i.e. foreign banks are less committed to assisting the domestic 
economy in troubled times. It is of interest to observe that the contraction of lending for 
foreign banks is not fully associated with the domestic economic situation in Russia. The 
fact that foreign banks react before the beginning of the crisis while other banks do not 
modify their lending behavior provides clear evidence of lack of loyalty. It means that for-
eign banks reduce their lending in a country even if it is not yet affected by the financial 
crisis, i.e. without reasons based on the negative macroeconomic situation. This shows a 
different lending behavior of foreign banks, which can be interpreted as the anticipation of Zuzana Fungáčová, Risto Herrala and Laurent Weill  The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: 
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the forthcoming negative economic evolution. It does not mean that only foreign banks 
predict the economic changes. However, domestic banks might consider the possible self-
fulfilling mechanism of their behavior as reduced lending might increase the chances of 
economic troubles and thus prefer to act differently. That is why the difference between 
foreign banks and domestic banks does not stem from different skills to anticipate the de-
velopment in the economy but in a different sense of loyalty towards the domestic eco n-
omy. 
These results for foreign banks do not comport with other findings for emerging 
countries (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 2000). The differences may result from the fact that 
the examined crisis was so extreme that it drove foreign banks to such behavior. In other 
words, foreign banks may not behave differently in credit supply in normal times or during 
mild downturns. They only engage in disloyal behavior when bigger international crises 
arise. 
Third, state-controlled banks reduce their credit supply less than domestic private 
banks during the crisis. The interaction variables between state ownership and time dummy 
variables are all significant and positive for the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first two 
quarters of 2009, the time when the crisis in Russia reached its peak. They are also signifi-
cant for one quarter showing the first signs of the crisis, the fourth quarter of 2007, for 
which we observe a significantly negative time dummy variable showing a general reduc-
tion of credit supply. 
Thus, our findings affirm the view that state-controlled banks have a different ob-
jective function than other banks: they support the economy in troubled times by limiting 
their reduction of credit supply. These results are in accordance with Micco and Panizza 
(2006), who show that lending by state-owned banks is less sensitive to macroeconomic 
shocks than private bank lending at the cross-country level. They are also loosely related to 
the finding of Jia (2009) on the lower prudence of state-owned banks in China. 
Figure 1 shows the time fixed effects in the various banking groups. The time 
fixed effect for period t is calculated as α + αt for domestic private banks, α + αt + αs+ αst  
for state-controlled and α + αt + αf + αft  for foreign banks. The figure indicates differences 
in the development of credit supply relative to 2007Q1 across the banking groups. More 
negative values indicate tighter credit supply constraints and therefore lower credit supply. 
Since the scale effects do not vary across the different banking groups in this model, they 
do not affect the comparison. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 34/ 2011 
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We observe a tightening of credit supply starting from the beginning of the period 
for all banking groups. This tightening speeds up from the third quarter of 2008 and per-
sists until overall credit availability starts to improve in 2009Q3 as the effects of the inter-
national financial crisis begin to ease. 
Significant differences in the development of credit supply constraints across the 
banking groups are revealed. Credit availability from foreign banks differed from the do-
mestic private banks mainly in terms of timing of the crisis reaction. Foreign banks reacted 
two quarters earlier: they tightened credit policy relative to the private domestic banks in 
2008Q1 and 2008Q2. Afterwards no statistical difference can be observed between foreign 
and domestic private banks until 2009Q2, when private banks loosen their credit policy 
and foreign banks retain their tight credit policy stance.  
The estimations indicate a significant difference between the crisis reactions of 
state-controlled banks and private banks. Figure 1 shows that credit availability from state-
controlled banks was much higher relative to the private banks during the peak of the crisis 
(2008Q4-2009Q2). Starting from 2009Q3, the gap between private and state-controlled 
banks narrows as private banks expand credit supply. The gap between domestic and for-
eign banks is maintained as foreign banks keep their restrictive credit policies in place. 
 
5.2  Alternative models 
 
We now turn to the alternative models described in Table 3. We start with a robustness 
check to test the sensitivity of our results to the distribution of the inefficiency term. Sev-
eral possibilities for this distribution have been proposed and applied in the literature on 
stochastic frontier approach.
5 We consider a half-normal distribution rather than an expo-
nential distribution for the inefficiency term in this robustne ss check as the half-normal 
distribution is commonly used in works applying stochastic frontier approach (e.g. Karas, 
Schoors and Weill, 2010). The log-likelihood is slightly lower with this distribution than 
with the exponential distribution, justifying our choice of the latter for our main model. 
With few exceptions, this specification does not affect the results. We still observe 
the reduction of credit supply during the financial crisis with significantly negative time 
dummy variables for all quarters from the fourth quarter of 2008 until the fourth quarter of 
2009, while no time dummy variables are significant before this time. 
                                                 
5 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for the stochastic frontier approach and its different applications. Zuzana Fungáčová, Risto Herrala and Laurent Weill  The Influence of Bank Ownership on Credit Supply: 
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We show again that foreign banks have reduced their credit supply more than do-
mestic private banks during the financial crisis. The results are similar for the interaction 
variables between foreign ownership and time dummy variables, which are significantly 
negative for the two first quarters of 2008 and the three last quarters of 2009. Finally, we 
still see the lower reduction of credit supply for state-controlled banks relative to domestic 
private banks. The interaction variables between state ownership and time dummy v ari-
ables are all significant and positive for the fourth quarter of 2008 and three quarters of 
2009.  
Second, we test an alternative specification of our model in which we add interac-
tion variables between capital and ownership dummy variables. This allows the sensitivity 
of the maximum risk-weighted assets-to-capital ratio to vary across bank ownership type. 
It is important to test this since the scale effect of capital on credit supply constraints may 
vary significantly across types of banks. 
Our main results remain unchanged even if we allow the scale effect of capital to 
vary across types of banks. The reduction  of credit supply is again supported by the fact 
that time dummy variables are significantly negative for the fourth quarter of 2007 and all 
quarters from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2009. We also observe a 
greater reduction of credit supply for foreign banks than for domestic private banks with 
significantly negative coefficients for the interaction variables between foreign ownership 
and time dummy variables for most quarters. Furthermore, we can still see that state -
controlled banks can be characterized by a lower decrease in credit supply during the f i-
nancial crisis; the interaction terms between state ownership and time dummy variables are 
significantly positive for the last quarter of 2008 and the two first quarters of 2009. We 
conclude that even if the scale effect of capital appears to vary across the banking groups, 
our main findings are robust to such variation. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate how bank ownership influenced credit supply during the re-
cent financial crisis in Russia. The Russian banking industry is of particular interest as it is 
characterized by a mix of foreign-owned banks, state-controlled domestic banks, and pri-
vately owned domestic banks. We apply an innovative methodology to analyze credit sup-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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ply using the stochastic frontier approach that allows assessment of bank credit supply in 
comparison to the level of capital − a key constraint for the bank. 
The literature suggests that the behavior of banks during economic downturns 
may vary with bank ownership. Specifically, there is an expectation that foreign banks 
might reduce their lending more than other banks because of a potential “lack of loyalty” 
to actors in the domestic economy. State-owned banks, in contrast, might tend to keep 
lending as their objective function might include macroeconomic stabilization. 
Our main conclusion is that bank ownership exerted an impact on credit supply 
during the recent financial crisis in Russia. Whereas credit supply overall diminished dur-
ing the crisis, we observe that this reduction was greater for foreign banks and lower for 
state-controlled banks relative to domestic private banks. 
Thus, we find support for the “lack of loyalty” hypothesis, whereby foreign banks 
are prone to a stronger reduction in lending than domestic banks in troubled times. We also 
provide evidence in favor of the view according to which the objective function of state-
owned banks would lead them to support the economy during economic downturns. 
The implications of our findings are that the privatization of state-owned banks 
and foreign bank entry may contribute to deterioration of the economic situation during an 
economic downturn. This does not mean that the policies to encourage entry of foreign 
banks should be abandoned; foreign banks generate many benefits such as efficiency gains 
in the sector (Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010).  
Looking ahead, our methodology for studying the bank credit channel holds con-
siderable promise. Unlike the approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and ex-
tended by Jimenez et al. (2010) for estimation of credit supply of banks by analyzing the 
bank credit channel, our methodology avoids the need for data on borrowers. It simply re-
quires data on banks, and thereby opens avenues for broad research on the lending channel 
of monetary policy transmission. 
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Tables and figure 
 
Table 1  Capital adequacy ratio by ownership subgroups 
 




  State-controlled banks  Foreign banks  Domestic private banks 
Quarter  Obs.  Mean  s.d.  Obs.  Mean  s.d.  Obs.  Mean  s.d. 
                   
1Q2007  22  16.1  5.6  37  20.2  11.5  423  22.8  17.8 
2Q2007  23  16.9  10.3  18  24.7  24.7  401  22.8  19.4 
3Q2007  19  14.1  3.3  24  22.9  21.0  381  22.1  15.6 
4Q2007  23  17.8  8.9  29  18.6  9.8  395  25.2  24.1 
1Q2008  22  16.3  10.3  54  23.3  18.9  458  22.1  13.0 
2Q2008  22  17.3  10.6  54  23.6  20.8  436  22.0  15.2 
3Q2008  31  15.9  9.5  59  20.1  13.6  413  23.2  16.9 
4Q2008  32  18.1  12.5  60  24.7  18.1  407  26.5  16.1 
1Q2009  31  20.5  19.1  61  25.1  17.0  413  27.1  16.0 
2Q2009  33  19.2  8.6  60  30.0  23.1  403  27.5  17.2 
3Q2009  37  20.5  8.1  60  32.1  25.3  428  28.9  20.5 
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Table 2  Estimation results for the benchmark model 
 
Estimations by maximum likelihood on a pooled cross-section. All variables are in natural logarithms. 
Constant terms and time variable effects for capital are included but not reported. All models allow 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals in time. Residual parameters are not reported. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses next to estimated coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 
10%, 5%, or 1% level. All models converge normally. 
 
Explanatory variables    Estimated coefficients 
Capital    1.03*** (0.01) 
State-controlled     -0.06* (0.04) 
Foreign-owned     -0.004  (0.03) 
Time fixed effects 
07Q2  0.05  (0.07) 
07Q3  -0.02  (0.08) 
07Q4  -0.19* (0.1) 
08Q1  -0.08  (0.08) 
08Q2  -0.15* (0.08) 
08Q3  -0.12  (0.08) 
08Q4  -0.63*** (0.12) 
09Q1  -0.8*** (0.14) 
09Q2  -0.8*** (0.13) 
09Q3  -0.9*** (0.13) 
09Q4  -0.67*** (0.14) 
State-controlled banks time fixed 
effects 
07Q2  0.04  (0.07) 
07Q3  0.07  (0.07) 
07Q4  0.12* (0.06) 
08Q1  0.03  (0.07) 
08Q2  0.04  (0.07) 
08Q3  0.07  (0.07) 
08Q4  0.25*** (0.09) 
09Q1  0.29*** (0.09) 
09Q2  0.21** (0.09) 
09Q3  0.13  (0.1) 
09Q4  0.11  (0.11) 
Foreign-owned banks time fixed 
effects 
07Q2  -0.07  (0.05) 
07Q3  -0.05  (0.06) 
07Q4  -0.03  (0.06) 
08Q1  -0.09* (0.05) 
08Q2  -0.1* (0.05) 
08Q3  -0.06  (0.05) 
08Q4  0.0002  (0.08) 
09Q1  0.0001  (0.08) 
09Q2  -0.1  (0.08) 
09Q3  -0.2** (0.08) 
09Q4  -0.17** (0.08) 
Observations    5829 
Log-likelihood    -3263.453 
Info criterion: AIC    1.144 
Finite sample AIC    1.145 
Info criterion: BIC    1.227 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 3  Estimation results for alternative specifications as robustness check 
 
Estimations by maximum likelihood on a pooled cross section. All variables are in natural logarithms. Constant 
terms and time variable effects for capital are included but not reported. All models allow heteroscedasticity of 
the residuals in time. Residual parameters are not reported. Standard errors appear in parentheses next to esti-
mated coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. All 
models converge normally. 
 
Explanatory variables    Specification with  
half-normal distribution 
Specification with interaction terms between  
capital and ownership dummy variables 
Capital    1.03*** (0.01)  1.03*** (0.01) 
State-controlled    -0.06 (0.07)  0.13 (0.11) 
Foreign-owned    -0.01 (0.04)  -0.28*** (0.09) 
State-controlled* capital      0.04*** (0.01) 
Foreign-owned*capital      -0.02*** (0.01) 
Time fixed effects 
07Q2  0.07  (0.13)  0.05 (0.07) 
07Q3  -0.01  (0.11)  -0.01 (0.08) 
07Q4  -0.16  (0.13)  -0.17* (0.10) 
08Q1  -0.05  (0.1)  -0.07 (0.08) 
08Q2  -0.09  (0.11)  -0.13 (0.08) 
08Q3  -0.07  (0.12)  -0.11 (0.09) 
08Q4  -0.5*** (0.14)  -0.62*** (0.12) 
09Q1  -0.69*** (0.16)  -0.78*** (0.14) 
09Q2  -0.68*** (0.15)  -0.79*** (0.13) 
09Q3  -0.74*** (0.15)  -0.89*** (0.13) 
09Q4  -0.5*** (0.16)  -0.65*** (0.14) 
State-controlled banks time 
fixed effects 
07Q2  0.02  (0.14)  0.05 (0.07) 
07Q3  0.07  (0.12)  0.02 (0.08) 
07Q4  0.12  (0.1)  0.08 (0.08) 
08Q1  0.01  (0.11)  0.01 (0.10) 
08Q2  0.03  (0.12)  0.04 (0.09) 
08Q3  0.07  (0.13)  0.09 (0.08) 
08Q4  0.24** (0.11)  0.25** (0.10) 
09Q1  0.28*** (0.11)  0.30*** (0.10) 
09Q2  0.22* (0.12)  0.22** (0.10) 
09Q3  0.13  (0.13)  0.13 (0.11) 
09Q4  0.11  (0.14)  0.11 (0.11) 
Foreign-owned banks time 
fixed effects 
07Q2  -0.07  (0.09)  -0.16*** (0.05) 
07Q3  -0.07  (0.08)  -0.11* (0.06) 
07Q4  -0.04  (0.08)  -0.05 (0.05) 
08Q1  -0.09* (0.05)  -0.14*** (0.04) 
08Q2  -0.11  (0.06)  -0.17*** (0.05) 
08Q3  -0.05  (0.07)  -0.12*** (0.05) 
08Q4  -0.02  (0.08)  -0.05 (0.08) 
09Q1  -0.01  (0.09)  -0.04 (0.08) 
09Q2  -0.11  (0.08)  -0.15** (0.08) 
09Q3  -0.2** (0.09)  -0.25*** (0.08) 
09Q4  -0.17* (0.09)  -0.23*** (0.08) 
Observations    5829  5829 
Log-likelihood    -3266.061  -3246.010 
Info criterion: AIC    1.145  1.139 
Finite sample AIC    1.146  1.139 
Info criterion: BIC    1.228  1.224 
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Figure 1  Proportionality factors of credit policy for different banking groups 
 
The figure shows the proportionality factors in the various banking groups. More negative values indicate 
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